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"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw 
my attention?" 
"To the Curious incident of the dog in the night-time". 
"The dog did nothing in the night-time". 
"That was the curious incident", remarked Sherlock Holmes. 
The Conservative government formed after the May 1979 general 
election lacked a parliamentary majority in Scotland. For the seventh 
election in succession the Scottish people had returned a Labour maj-
ority. The government owed its parliamentary strength to its victor-
ies in the South of England. Forty-four of Scotland's seven~y-one 
MPs were Labour: twenty-two Conservative: there were also three 
each sitting for the Liberal and the Scottish National parties. To 
be sure, Labour's predominance amongst Scotland's MPs overstated her 
plurality in votes. Labour won 41.5% of the vote to the Conservative's 
31.4%. The SNP won 17.3% and the Liberals held 9.0%. But it was the 
apparent permanence of the Labour plurality which stood out. 
From the moment the results were declared it was obvious to all 
that the newly elected Government would have trouble in Scotland. 
How, with just twenty-two MPs would it find sufficient men of calibre 
to run the Scottish Office and contribute to the British ministries 
while also running the Commons' committees? Labour would be able to 
use its majority on the Scottish Grand Committee to needle the gov-
ernment; it could use the Chair of the Scottish Select Committee 
(resurrected by the newly elected Government) to expose the weakness 
of the administration; and its control of Scotland's major local 
authorities to defend local services against Westminster attack. 
Surely no government lacking a Scottish majority could expect to 
push through the kind of policies to which the Thatcher team were 
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committed without difficulty. 
Some of the central ideas in the new Government's manifesto 
were bound to hurt Scotland particularly. Cutting public expenditure 
would take cash away from the industries and public services on 
which Scotland was disproportionately dependent. "Improving the pro-
ductivity" of the nationalised industries might easily lead to con-
siderable unemployment in Scotland. Cuts in regional employment 
grants, on which Scotland was dependent would hurt too. Only a curso-
ry glance at the history of recent Conservative governments lacking 
a Scottish plurality showed the danger. The Macmillan-Home adminis-
tration was harried to derision toward the end of its term by the 
Scottish Parliamentary Labour team led by Willie Ross. The Heath 
government had been forced into one of its most humiliating voltes-
face over the collapse of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. 
And the new Government had more than Labour to fear. If the 
official Opposition failed to make the running against her, then the 
SNP was only too anxious to do so. After all, it was under previous 
Conservative administrations that the SNP had erupted. In 1962 in 
West Lothian, and again in 1973 in Glasgow Govan it showed its mettle. 
Throughout Britain the 'third' parties had historically grown fast-
est under Conservative governments. The scene for another such ad-
vance could hardly have been more carefully set. 
Undaunted, the Government has fulfilled its promises. It did 
not flinch from cutting the social services: public capital expen-
diture on items like school buildings and housing has all but stopped. 
All locally administered services - other than the police - have 
suffered. British Leyland has ceased to produce tractors in Scotland; 
Linwood- Scotland's last automobile assembly plant closed in May 
1981. The huge pulp mill in Fort William has ceased production. At 
Invergordon in the Highlands only one week's notice of the closure 
of the aluminium smelter was given. Prestwick lost much of its North 
American trade. Government policies have robbed Scotland, and yet, 
there is the curious incident of the guard dog in the night-time. The 
dog did nothing in the night-time. It neither bit nor barked. 
I 
Elections can be a time for barking or for biting. Since the 
1979 general election there have been three parliamentary by-elections 
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and two Scotland-wide local elections. There were parliamentary by-
elections in Glasgow Central, Glasgow Hillhea~and Coatbridge and 
Airdrie. There were local government elections for the Districts 
(all of Scotland other than the three island councils) in May 1980 
and for the Regions (all of Scotland) in May 1982. 
The by-election in Glasgow Central, occurred in June 1980. 
Glasgow Central is one of the smallest seats in the United Kingdom. 
Its electorate at the by-election was 18,854. It is also overwhelm-
ingly Labour. The election happened a year after the new Government 
took office. For all of these reasons only a sensational overturning 
of the Labour majority would have given any general meaning to this 
result. In the event Labour and Conservative candidates both lost 
votes. Labour lost 11% of its general election percentage; the 
Conservative lost 7% of its May 1980 percentage. The SNP managed to 
discover some voters in the desolate parking lots of Glasgow Central 
and put its vote up respectably from 11% to 26%. no one, however, 
saw any sign of revolt against the Government here. 
The previous month all of Scotland had a chance to vote in the 
District elections. 45% of the voters turned out - a small drop on 
the previous election in 1977. Labour gained 45% of the vote, an 
improvement of 14% since 1977: the Conservatives gained 24%, a 
drop of 3% and the SNP lost 8% to end at 15% of the total. The most 
important change in votes was the drop in the nationalist vote. But 
more important Labour gained control of a number of Councils which 
had previously not had any one party in over-all control. They re-
gained control of eleven districts which had previously been theirs 
in 1974 but they had lost in 1977. They gained control of four Dist-
ricts in which they had only previously been the largest party 
Dundee, Falkirk, Clydebank and Strathkelvin - and they took four ~n 
which they had never previously been even the largest party 
Clackmannan, Cumbernauld and Kilsyth, East Kilbride and Kyle and 
Carrick. These gains were mostly achieved at the expense of the SNP 
and they further strengthened the hand of Labour in Opposition to 
the Conservative Secretary of State, but the victories of May 1980 
hardly registered electoral defeats for the Conservatives. They had 
too little to lose for that. 
In March 1982 the new Social Democratic/Liberal alliance captur-
ed control of Glasgow Hillhead in a parliamentary by-election. The 
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Alliance candidate, Roy Jenkins received 10,106 votes (33.4%); 
Gerald Malone the Conservative candidate came second with 8,086 
votes (26.6%) Labour's David Wiseman was third with 7,846 votes 
(25.9%) and the SNP candidatP lost his deposit, gaining only 3,416 
votes. The defeat of the Conservative candidate, in this,their only 
remaining seat in Glasgow,was certainly a major event. But Hillhead 
was seen as part of a British trend of SOP/Liberal Alliance victories 
and compared to its predecessors the Tories did not do at all badly. 
Their drop from 41% to 26% was nothing to be ashamed of. 
In May, under the shadow of the battle for the Falklands, voters 
in Scotland could choose between the parties in Regional elections. 
Forty-three per cent did so. Labour remain the largest party with 
37.3% of the vote, the Conservatives were second with 25.1%; the 
Alliance pushed its way into third place with 18% and the SNP brought 
up the rear with 13%. The Conservatives did well to become the dom-
inant group in Lothian Region·though Labour increased its already 
considerable lead in Strathclyde. The Conservatives and Labour have 
twenty-two seats each in Lothian, but the former have an informal 
pact with the Alliance which gives them control .. In Strathclyde 
Labour have seventy-nine seats to the Conservatives' fifteen - there 
are nine other councillors. In June 1982 Labour retained control of 
Coatbridge and Airdrie comfortably. Tom Clarke, the Labour candidate 
won 19,208 votes; Hugh de Burgh (Conservative) won 9,118 and the SNP 
and Liberal candidates lost their deposits. There was a small swing 
to the Conservatives in this socialist bastion. 
In none of this can one detect any major swing of votes away 
from the Government. The dog - or dogs - of opposition have failed 
to bark. Why? 
II 
In part the answer has to do with the skill of the Government. 
This is not simply a matter of media manipulation - though there is 
that - but rather of an older skill. The present Government is adept 
at knowing when to fight and when to give in. It gave in to the 
miners at the first sign of trouble but held out against the civil 
servants and eventually forced them to concede. It should also be 
said that despite some large, well publicised failures of economic 
policy, the Government has had some not insignificant successes. 
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Alec Fletcher, the junior spokesman on industry has done much to 
protect the independence of Scotland's industry and banking. Most 
of this work was done behind the scenes and yet a judicious policy 
of leaks has kept the Scottish press happy. Fletcher lobbied exten-
siveiy in private to preserve Ferranti - precisely the sort of 
high technology firm with its 7,000 employees that Scotland needs. 
Fletcher also arranged for the rival foreign bids for the Royal Bank 
of Scotland to be referred to the Monopolies Commission. That Commi-
ssion ultimately recommended that the Bank remain independent - that 
is, Scottish. 
But the Government's most impressive success was much more pub-
lic. It radically curtailed the independence of local governments, 
forced local authorities to make cuts many of the them protested 
were impossible, and made the most vociferous of their opponents 
take the blame. While making the cuts they focused the pubJic argu-
ment on the self-proclaimed Marxism of the Labour group in Lothian 
Region. 
By using the innocuously titled Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1981, the Government can require any auth-
ority whose expenditure it deems 'unreasonable and excessive' to re-
duce it. Not content with that, the Government went further in 1982. 
Overspending authorities are now required to return money to the 
rate-payers. Through their administration of these Acts the Govern-
ment has, in effect, thrown all caution to the wind. The old-fashioned 
notion that central and local government should collaborate, what-
ever the partisan differences between them, has been abandoned. 
Lothian, Dundee and Stirling have been made the chief whipping boys 
of Government action - not because they have behaved particularly 
outrageously as measured by any objective criteria - but simply be-
cause their Labour Councillors (especially in Lothian until May 1982) 
have clothed their actions in the rhetoric of the Left and sought 
confrontation with central government. 
The Government's action in destroying local autonomy in order 
to retaliate against certain local authorities is out of keeping with 
the prevailing style of the present Scottish Office team. Indeed, it 
is out of style with the normal Scottish Office mode of operation. It 
is also contrary to the traditional respect English Tories (at least 
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those in local government) have had for local autonomy. Scots Tories, 
who lacked a local government base until the mid-sixties have never 
had the same feeling as their southern brothers. On the contrary, 
Scots Tories are heir to the long tradition of colonial government 
and the present Scottish Office team is a colonial government at 
its best. Truly is George Younger heir to those Ministers at the 
Foreign Office who ruled a populous Nigeria with a bare handful of 
men. Younger has just twenty-two MPs to tie down the rebellious 
Scots, and, aided by a reticent Opposition front bench, he has been 
making a job of it. 
Lothian is, of course, the exception. It barked. From the return 
of the Conservative government in 1979 until Labour lost control of 
the region in May 1982, Lothian barked furiously. The genius - or 
luck - of the Government consisted in isolating Lothian. The fool-
ishness - or luck - of the Region consisted in its failure to make 
common cause with the other Labour controlled councils. In part this 
was a matter of dogma: the Lothian Labour Party contained many who 
wanted to be more left-wing than anyone else. In part too, it was a 
matter of overwhelming complexity. Councillors are amateurs and they 
have no paid political staff. Getting agreement within the Lothian 
group and with the Lothian Party was difficult enough. Working with 
Strathclyde and others was just too much to take on. But the effect 
was to make Lothian look the mad dog. The claim, for instance, of 
some of Lothian's senior Labour councillors, that acceptance of the 
£45 million cut demanded by the Government in June 1981 would mean 
14,000 redundancies -' a figure they never justified - was character-
istic. 
It is because the fight with the local authorities - especially 
Lothian - is so exceptional that it deserves serious consideration. 
Most of the initial barking came from Lothian Region. Their action 
in going for growth in 1980 when the Government was pressing local 
authorities to cut back was the flag which attracted the Tory bull. 
The 53% rates increases which the Lothian Council forced on its con-
stituents offered the Government a potential weapon: appeal to the 
ratepayers' sense of outrage, force the 'local reds' to give the 
money back. Lothian made the confrontation all the more inevitable 
by refusing to trim even when the Government had made its intentions 
known. 
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From that point most of the aggression came from the Younger 
team. The question is, why? Several possible answers suggest them-
selves: pressure from the Prime Minister and the Cabinet must have 
been a factor: pressure from Edinburgh Conservative MPs and party 
members was not lacking: but above all there was the temptation to 
take a swipe at a local authority which had had the effrontery to 
unfurl the Red Flag over Scotland's capital. Around its 'cut the 
rates' slogan the Government was able to rally its own voters and 
isolate Lothian. The final fruit of this victory came in May 1982 
when the voters of Lothian voted Labour out in four Regional seats 
and gave the administration of the Region to a Conservative domina-
ted coalition. 
There was, to be sure, one public attempt to outmanoeuvre the 
Government on this issue. RAGE - the Rate-payers' Action Group Execu-
tive - threatened at one point to put up candidates against the Con-
servative candidates in the 1982 Regional elections. The threat was 
born of ratepayer frustration at the ineffectiveness of these coun-
cillors in stopping the rates' rise. But in the event this possible 
split in the right wing vote was avoided - but not too surprisingly, 
as the leader of RAGE, David Guest had been an officer of the Con-
servative Party in Edinburgh North all along! In May 1982 he was an 
unsuccessful Conservative candidate himself. 
The ballot boxes had hardly been restored to their cupboards 
when Guest, wearing his RAGE hat, began to attack the government 
again. This time it appeared that neither the new Conservative domin-
ated Region nor the Government were sufficiently serious about cutt-
ing the rates to placate RAGE. Men who wear many hats can sometimes 
remind one of circus clowns: but Guest's renewed attack pointed up 
a serious enough problem for the Government: having raised ratepay-
ers expectations in order to win votes, they had better do something 
to fulfil them. This is the second time within three years that the 
Conservatives have played the ratepayers card. First they promised 
to abolish the rates in their General Election ( and did nothing); 
later they ran against high-spending, high-rating Labour councils. 
They have not abolished the rates because their own civil servants 
have shown them how difficult the task is: the income would be di-
fficult to replace. They have trouble keeping the rates down- or 
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forcing councils to return it- because of the damage this might do 
to services. In this later argument we see that the Tories have not 
had it all their own way. Labour has done much to win the public 
argument about the level of services citizens need from Local Gov-
ernment. This has cut the new Conservative rulers of Lothian's room 
for manoeuvre. 
Part of the Government's success in Scotland since the General 
Election has to do with the Conservative Party's public unity. The 
difficulties with RAGE threatened to break this facade, but only 
momentarily. On the whole the Conservatives have continued their 
tradition of allowing other parties to fight each other in public. 
But this is far from saying that the Conservative Party in Scotland 
is of one mind on the key issues: it isn't. The major division with-
in the party is between the localists and the centralisers. In Eng-
land, the Conservative Party has a strong and well entrenched in-
terest in local politics. In Scotland it lacks this tradition and 
until the late 'Sixties the Conservative Party was content to allow 
others to fight their local government battles. Most Conservative 
voters plumped for 'Independent' or 'Progressive' candidates. Never-
theless, the Conservative Party has a strong ideological objection 
to strong central control and its ties with agricultural, rural, and 
landed interests, bids it hold off too strong a use of central gov-
ernment powers. Now Conservativffifight local government elections 
under their own banner- and control a number of councils- th2ir 
interest in preserving local autonomy is stronger than ever. But the 
pressures these interests and sentiments induce are countered by 
their overwhelming posture as a colonial government in Scotland. After 
all, C OSLA are largely hostile to Conservatism. 
The election of a Conservative dominated council in Lothian is 
bound to strengthen the hands of the localists within the Tory party. 
It may also, marginally, affect the stance of COSLA, the local gov-
ernment voice of Scotland, and make it less Socialist. Their control 
of Lothian lasted hardly a month before the new council began to 
squabble with the Government. In this way the fight within the Con-
servative Party may become more public, and more difficult for the 
party managers to control. The hand of the localists has also been 
immeasurably strengthened by the promotion out of the Scottish Office 
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of Malcolm Rifkind. Rifkind was central government's man in charge 
of relations with local government. His replacement, Alan Stewart 
(MP East Renfrewshire) is not in the same league. Stewart is also 
much less effective against Labour's local government spokesman in 
the House of Commons, Donald Dewar (MP, Garscadden). 
III 
But if part of the government's success in Scotland can be cred-
ited to its own efforts, that is far from the whole of the story. 
The opposition are in disarray. The internal wrangles of the Labour 
Party have played a role, but the problems of Labour have to do with 
much more fundamental causes. The differences within the Conservative 
camp between localists and centralisers are as nothing compared to 
the differences within the Labour movement between the unions and 
the Labour Party. The Government's economic policy which has led to 
a doubling of unemployment- to 324,709 in May 1982- has-not pro-
duced any coherent response from Labour. 
Initially this had much to do with the shock and horror of the 
election of the Thatcher team and with the guilt not a few union 
leaders felt about their own role in the demise of the Callaghan 
government. But this was soon put aside. The Government, for its 
part, cleverly divided the union movement into the strong and the 
weak. It avoided fights with the former and slapped down the latter. 
It also increased unemployment. This hurt union finances and made it 
more difficult for union leaders to convince their men to come out, 
or stay out,on strike. These problems intensified as the Government 
passed the halfway mark of its term. In the summer of 1982 one could 
even hear trade union officials speaking of major unions going bank-
rupt within months. Such is not the stuff of strong opposition. 
For its part the Parliamentary Labour Party has been so caught 
up in the internal constitutional disputes of its party since the 
General Election, that it has not formed a popular alternative to 
the Government. 
The Parliamentary Labour Party opposed three constitutional 
changes: party-wide election of the Leader and Deputy Leader; man-
datory reselection of MPs between each election; and control of the 
Manifesto by the NEC. The first two of these battles it lost. Soon 
the PLP selected Michael Foot to succeed James Callaghan in a forlorn 
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attempt to stop the rot. The Labour Party has been riven between a 
more or less united Parliamentary Party on the one hand and the 
large majority of Constituency Parties on the other. The latter 
blame the former for the mistakes of the last government. The trade 
unions are evenly split on these issues. One result of the struggles 
within the party and the changes in the Constitution which the re-
formers in the Constituency Parties have won is that MPs no longer 
feel secure in their seats. Cut off from behind they are in no po-
sition from which to attack Mrs Thatcher. 
The British Labour Party fights have had their echo in Scot-
land. The majority of the Scottish constituency parties are normally 
in the reformist wing of the party. There was a short time too -
in October and November 1981 when the Scottish Council (of the 
Labour Party) Executive was in the hands of the left. In those months 
it backed Mr Benn in his fight with Mr Foot. But mostly the Scottish 
Council Executive has not embarrassed the Leadership. 
There is a paradox about Labour in Scotland in this period. On 
the one hand the party is capable of passing left wing resolutions 
and of accusing the previous Labour Government of every knavery im-
aginable. On the other hand, not a single Scottish Labour MP has 
failed to gain reselection though Mr Willie Hamilton in Central 
Fife came very close- and the majority of Labour's Scottish MPs are 
on the right of the parliamentary party. Mr Bruce Millan's position 
as Shadow Scottish Secretary is unchallenged and his team is hardly 
full of left-wingers. Though there are some dependable supporters of 
Mr Benn amongst Scottish MPs,Ernie Ross (Dundee West), Ron Brown 
(Leith) and Allan Adams (Paisley) amongst them,none of these carries 
much weight. Labour's 1982 (British) Chairman, on the other hand is 
Mrs Judith Hart, MP (Lanark) and she often sides with Benn but makes 
no impression on Scottish politics. 
The other outstanding feature about Labour in Scotland is the 
impressive solidity- one might say stolidity- of its vote in 
Strathclyde Region. Neither of the newer parties - the SNP or the 
SOP - has been able to break this hold. In May 1982 Labour's pro-
portion of the Strathclyde vote actually rose by 3%. It is notice-
able that the more respectable Labour leadership in the West is able 
to hold its vote while the more tempestuous Lothian Party is not: 
whether there is anything more than a coincidence here is impossible 
to say. 
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One noticeable feature of the Labour Party in the present par-
liament is its slow retreat from devolution. The retreat is yet to 
be registered in formal resolutions. Nominally the party is as co-
mmitted to devolution as ever and some senior spokesmen,such as 
John Smith MP (North Lanark) Labour's frontbench spokesman on Trade 
push the cause within Labour's councils, as George Foulkes MP 
(South Ayrshire) pushes it in public. All now see that local govern-
ment is an unsatisfactory platform from which to resist the policies 
of a central government. But most are cool. Already the signs of 
weakened interest in devolution are noticeable. At the 1981 party 
conference at Brighton no fringe meeting on devolution could be or-
ganised: no speaker of stature would perform. In the Spring of 1982 
Labour's draft "Programme for 1982" (which may well be the basis of 
the next general election manifesto) caused consternation in Scotland 
when it was realised that it made only passing reference ~o devolu-
tion. 
IV 
If Labour has failed to make much of an impact why has the SNP 
not filled the vacuum? The SNP entered the parliament badly deflated. 
In the middle seventies it had shaken the foundations of the state: 
by the end of the decade it had lost its way. The Scotland Act of 
the previous Government would have given Scotland a measure of home 
rule. The SNP had campaigned for it even though it thought the measure 
paltry. Scots had let the opportunity go in the referendum of March 
1st 1979 when a third of voters said 1 yes 1 , a third said 1 no 1 and a 
third stayed at home. In the following May the SNP slipped back from 
second to third place amongst the Scottish parties and held only two 
of its eleven seats. 
Not surprisingly the first reaction to these events was to blame 
the defeat on the party's own moderate line. At its 1979 annual con-
ference the SNP decided that next time it would campaign for full in-
dependence - nothing less. It would have no more truck with parties 
who promised devolution. At that Conference too, the SNP moved de-
cisively toward the personalities who had always championed a simple 
uncomplicated appeal for independence. It rejected the sophisticated 
ideas of the newly formed 1 79 Group. 
The '79 Group was the most interesting faction of the Scottish 
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Party. It brought together many of the younger ex-Labour and ex-left-
wing members of the SNP and committed itself to working for an in-
dependent socialist republic. Its most prominent members were Margo 
MacDonald (ex MP for Govan) and Stephen Maxwell (ex-Press Officer) 
and they were joined a year later by Jim Sillars (ex-Labour MP for 
South Ayrshire who broke away from Labour to found the short-lived 
Scottish Labour Party). 
Most of the Group's thinking came from Maxwell. He urged that 
the SNP's only future lay in wooing the Labour vote. The Party had 
to divest itself of its petit-bourgeois image. It had to show the 
working people of Scotland that their patience with the Labour Party 
was earning them nothing. In election after election, Scotland re-
turned Labour majorities to England. To win in Scotland the SNP 
needed to break the Labour vote - not the Conservative vote - there-
fore it should challenge Labour on its own territory: Socialism. 
There has long been a lacuna in this strategy which may prevent 
it from winning many votes. Labour votes are not the same as socia-
list votes. Britain's working people have voted for a respectable 
Labour Party. They are not perhaps as keen on socialism. In Scotland 
the leadership of the party is more united and more obviously res-
pectable than in England - no Tony Benn, no Ken Livingstone and only 
a brief glimpse of George Galloway - hence some of the solidity of 
Labour's support in Scotland. Labour's increased strength in Strath-
clyde points up this trend. In Strathclyde Labour provide a very re-
spectable leadership.: in Lothian they are a trifle unreliable. The 
1 79 Group's hope that ex-Labour voters will remain socialist voters 
and vote for a socialist nationalist party thus runs considerable 
dangers: that ex-Labour voters might either stay at home or vote 
for a right wing party. 
Initially the bulk of SNP conference delegates were unimpressed 
by this strategy. But the leaders they elected in 1979 did nothing. 
The SNP 1 s voice, once so loud and clear, all but disappeared. At the 
May 1981 conference the party reversed itself. It elected Jim 
Sillars, not yet a member of one years standing, as a Vice-Chairman. 
Sillars, a member of the 1 79 Group- even if many in the Group felt 
more used than helped by him committed himself to a campaign of 
civil disobedience at the 1981 Conference. People who were there re-
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member Sillars promising that the jails would be full - the SNP 
would court martyrdom. Along with Sillars the Conference elected 
other prominent 1 79ers to the Executive. 
The campaign of civil disobedience which Sillars organised on 
behalf of the SNP consisted of breaking into the deserted Royal High 
School building in Edinburgh (the once proposed site for the devolved 
Assembly) with a number of colleagues. He was fined. Fed up with the 
opprobrium which they thought such antics attracted to the party, a 
number of right-wing members, led by Mrs Winifred Ewing (MEP for 
Highlands and Islands) counterattacked on the eve of the party's 
1982 Conference. They set up another faction. This forced the hand af 
Party Chairman Gordon Wilson,who attacked all factions and the Con-
ference passed a resolution banning factions and giving their members 
three months to disband. 
The voters uninterest in these activities was shown starkly 
twice in the Spring of 1982. In March, despite having an excellent 
candidate in George Leslie and a ferociously active campaign, the 
SNP could manage only a fourth place in the Hillhead by-election. 
More damagingly, the seat went to a man wh~perhaps as much as any-
one living,personified the sophisticated affluent South of England 
to many Scots - Roy Jenkins. Jenkins, on behalf of the newly created 
Social Democratic Party - in alliance with the Liberals - won the 
seat and humiliated Leslie and the SNP by simply ignoring them. 
By-elections with a major national figure such as-Mr Jenkins 
competing in them are typical of nothing. The SNP tried to console 
itself that it would improve its performance in the May 1982 Region-
al elections. It was not to be. With the exception of Central Region, 
where the SNP remained the second party to Labour and a few rural 
seats which the SNP managed to win, the results of May were bleak 
for the SNP. Labour, with 37.3% of the vote won 188 regional seats; 
the Conservatives with 25.1% won 119 seats; the alliance of Liberals 
and Social Democrats came third with 18% of the vote and 25 seats and 
the SNP was pushed into fourth with 13.4% of the vote and 23 seats. 
The Independents and others won 165,mostly rural seats on 6.2% of 
the vote. 
Not only had the new alliance pushed the SNP down away from the 
action, the humiliation was increased by the fact that the new party 
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was so unScottish in appeal. More damaging to the '79 Group strategy, 
the Social Democrats seemed to have scored particularly well amongst 
the voters the SNP's left had wanted. It appeared - these remarks 
are necessarily impressionistic - that those voters who deserted 
Labour went not to the SNP but to the SOP. The new party was thus 
blocking the 1 79 Group's most hopeful line of advance. Reduced to 
fourth place faction-ridden and apparently halted the SNP was in no 
position to frighten the government. 
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The Social Democratic Party was formed in March 1981. It was 
formed from the top-down. Its founders were prominent people, most 
of them MPs, some senior ex-Ministers. Around them the founders quic~ 
ly built a party executive, a bureaucracy and individual members. The 
individual members were vital in the early stages for their £9 per 
annum membership fees were the party's main source of income. The 
first Scottish electoral test of the new party - and of its new 
alliance with the Liberal Party- occurred on March 25th 1982: the 
day before the Party's first birthday. 
Robert MacLennan MP (Caithness and Sutherland) and a barrister 
joined the Party at an early stage. He was subsequently joined by 
another Labour MP, Dr. J. Dickson Mabon (Greenock and Port Glasgow). 
MacLennan had an important role in the counsels of the new Party. 
He drafted the constitution. The new constitution proposed by the 
leaders to the membership suggested that the Party be organised not 
on the traditional Constituency basis but on an 'area' basis. These 
areas were to be groups of two to seven constituencies. The Areas 
were to be grouped into Regions. Scotland would be a Region. 
The party members accepted most of the draft constitution which 
MacLennan put to them but insisted on some changes. They wanted in-
dividual constituencies to be able to be an area and they wanted re-
gions to be voluntary. The former change was important for the party 
in Scotland as in some parts - Lothian for instance - the 
party already was working on a constituency basis. Here they had 
sufficient members to make this practical. In the Strathclyde area 
however, they did not have many members and adopted the larger unit 
of organisation. The other change forced on the party by the members 
- making regions voluntary - was a blow to Scotland. It was widely 
29 
reckoned that this change would mean that only Scotland and Wales 
would form Regions and hence the Regions would not be an important 
tier within the party structure. 
Constitutional arrangements necessarily preoccupy a party in 
its early months. But building a party is more than writing a con-
stitution. A party needs members and votes as well. In Britain as a 
whole the party has a membership of about 70,000. This is about 110 
members per parliamentary seat. Scottish seats have fewer voters so 
it would be unreasonable for the party to expect to have as many 
members per seat here as in the South. In fact with 4,125 members 
there are an average of fifty-eight members per constituency in 
Scotland. 
The new Party's performance in the opinion polls trailed its 
performance in England. The party did well in England first and only 
began to catch on in Scotland later. At its euphoric peak in the wake 
of Mrs Williams' victory in Crosby in November 1981, the party touched 
48% in one UK poll. In Scotland it never reached more than 25% (in 
January 1982, twice in Sy~tem 3 polls). But almost immediately there-
after the public moved slowly away from the Party. Over the Christmas 
recess a row between the two allies over the allocation of parliamen-
tary seats - which party was to stand in which seats - broke out in 
public. The decline in Party fortunes can be dated from here. 
More generally it seems that the public, during the 1979 parlia-
ment, has been sensitive to rows within parties. The Labour Party 
reached a peak on the eve of its 1980 conference in Blackpool which 
led directly to the breaking away of the Social Democratic MPs. The 
two peaks of support for the new party - or for the idea of a new 
party - came in the wake of Labour's two most bitter periods of in-
ternal wrangling: after the Blackpool conference and leading up to, 
and after,the 1981 conference in Brighton. In the former case the 
Party wrangled over its constitution; in the latter it fought over 
using the new rules to elect a Deputy Leader. In the weeks before the 
Hillhead by-election Michael Foot patched together something of a 
truce - which he called the spirit of Bishops' Stortford (because 
he had the idea at a meeting there). Amongst other things the Hill-
head contest would see if the truce could last. 
Roy Jenkins began the Hillhead fight in the lead. His stature 
former Home Secretary, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, former 
30 
Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, former President of the European 
Commission and possible AlliancP leader and Prime Minister - turned 
a few heads. The Sunday Standard fairly swooned at the thought of a 
Prime Minister from Glasgow and the initial reactions of the Glasgow 
Herald and the Scotsman were not entirely dissimilar. 
In the event Jenkins nearly lost. He trailed in the opinion 
polls for much of the last two weeks. His party's efforts were saved 
only by the last minute rescue mounted by the Liberals. At no time 
did the Alliance dominate the activity on the streets as Mrs Williams' 
team had done at Crosby. The energetic SNP campaign saw to that. Of 
course, the SOP's newness did not help either. It had few members in 
the immediate vicinity. Glasgow North, which includes Hillhead as 
well as all of Garscadden, Kelvingrove, Provan, Springburn, Maryhill, 
Central and Shettleston and parts of Bothwell, Rutherglen and North 
Lanark, had only 380 members when the by-election began. Furthermore 
Jenkins did not receive the kind of free gift which the Conservatives 
gave Mrs Williams in Crosby; 
Labour made any major errors. 
in Hillhead neither Conservative nor 
With supreme good timing the Scottish Liberals had scheduled 
their annual conference for the day after the by-election in St. 
Andrews. Jenkins was received as a hero and he and David Steel began 
to talk in public about Jenkins' fight for the leadership of the SDP. 
In this Steel helped his friend by making it clear that Jenkins would 
be an acceptable leader of the Alliance. Should the SDP choose any-
one else Steel expected to be the leader. 
VI 
Jenkins' victory in Hillhead neatly encapsulates what had 
happened to Scottish party politics since 1979. It has been nation-
alised. One important reason why the Scottish Office team have such 
an easy ride is that their main opponents aim their fire as part of 
British armies, ignoring the Scottish front. Despite his strong 
commitment to devolution during the Hillhead by-election- which 
commitment suffers from some of the same problems as Labour's -
Jenkins has not made a single serious mark on Scottish politics 
sincp his election. 
Not surprisingly he has been more preoccupied with winning his 
Party's leadership. But then that is the problem. Should he become 
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Leader he will be a British, not a Scottish, figure. David Steel is 
a British figure for all that he sits on a Scottish seat. Jenkins 
position will be the same. He will not be able to give special att-
ention to Scottish issues. The Scottish press and broadcasters will 
not be able to use him - lest the other parties demand to have their 
leaders on too. 
Not more than two weeks after the Hillhead by-election the whole 
focus and emphasis of Scottish and British politics was changed by 
the Argentine invasion of the Falklands. The Falklands have served 
as a whaling base for a Scottish firm (Christian Salvesen), but even 
though one of its villages is called Leith the action has nothing to 
do with Scotland or the Scottish dimension of British Politics. On 
the contrary, the war for the Falkland islands displaced the entire 
political agenda. Items already low, such as devolution, disappear. 
Politicians associated with them also seemed to shrink. O~hers in-
creased in stature, like Dr David Owen - Mr Jenkins' rival for SDP 
leadership - and, most of all, the Prime Minister herself: - Boadicea 
reincarnated, who put everyone and everything else in her shadow. 
It is a long way from Leith to Leith. And you can't hear dogs at 
that distance even if they are barking very loudly. 
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